The transplant donor payment debate  by Delmonico, F.
has been a contentious subject for years,1 three specific
statements of his give us concern.2
First, his statement that Congress recently rejected donor
payments is inaccurate. Congress never voted on the Frist
bill, because it was killed in committee. Moreover, Congres-
sional decisions are usually driven by interest group politics,
not ethics, economics, or good medicine. Consequently, any
action (or inaction) taken by that body fails to support the
moral superiority of any policy position.
Secondly, Dr Delmonico’s statement regarding the need
for better preventive care is a classical ‘if-then’ fallacy of logic.
If we could prevent all kidney failure, then there would be no
shortage. That is true, but we cannot prevent all kidney
failure. When the antecedent phrase is false, then any
consequent phrase can be used to produce a true statement.
Clearly, prevention of kidney failure is a laudable goal, but
what do we do about the organ shortage until we can?
Thirdly, Dr Delmonico mentions the successes realized by
the Organ Donation Collaborative; however, although
donations have increased under that program, no one
seriously expects it to resolve the organ shortage.3 Have
patients stopped dying owing to the shortage? If not, more
needs to be done. And if that ‘more’ means donor payments,
we should begin to consider them.
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To the Editor: Years ago, Philip Held (for whom I have much
personal regard) introduced me to the writings of Dr
Kaserman.1 Thus, knowing of Dr Kaserman’s genuine and
long-standing interest in this issue, it is with much respect
that I furnish this reply.
My understanding of the Frist bill is that the Organ
Donation and Recovery Improvement Act was passed by the
Senate. The House had passed similar legislation (HR 399,
the Organ Donation Improvement Act of 2003). The Organ
Donation and Recovery Improvement Act was signed into
law by President George W Bush.2
The Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act
encourages organ donation, permits a reimbursement for
living donors for expenses related to organ donation, and
calls for a registry to monitor the long-term health of living
donors. All good! The bill was not killed in committee as Dr
Kaserman suggests. However, up till now, Congress has not
appropriated funding for the legislation. Perhaps that is Dr
Kaserman’s misunderstanding about this enacted legislation.
Nevertheless, the point is that the enacted legislation did not
include language that would permit the overturning of the
1984 National Organ Transplant Act that prohibits the
buying and selling of organs. That omission was intentional.
An attempt to include language for financial incentives
‘notwithstanding NOTA’ was not brought forward because of
objections from Senator Judd Gregg (Republican, NH, USA)
at least, but the staffs of Senator Kennedy and Dodd were of
similar mindset (Democrats, MA and CT, USA).
As to this bipartisan Congressional perspective, my
personal discussions with some of the following Senators,
but perhaps just as importantly with the legislative staff of
Senators Frist, Kennedy, Dodd, Gregg, Durbin, and DeWine,
and with Congressmen Bilirakis and Tauzin, and by my
presentation at the Hearings of Congressman Greenwood
(which included Democratic Congressmen Dingell, Inslee,
and DeGette), are the sources of my confidence that Congress
will not adopt a regulated market for organ sales.
Further, I would ask that Dr Kaserman not overlook
opposition to his proposal from The Transplantation Society,
The American Society of Transplantation, The American
Society of Transplant Surgeons (ASTS), the National Kidney
Foundation, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS),
and the World Health Organization. Notwithstanding the
writings of some prominent members of the ASTS, that
Society is on record as recently as last week, and that it is
opposed to the buying and selling of organs. These
organizations bring a powerful testimony to the debate
that will be persuasive, were that declaration necessary in
Congressional hearings. However, any further Congressional
review of this issue is clearly not contemplated at this time.
What Congress is currently attempting to resolve is the
possibility of sanctioned paired live organ donation.3
As to Dr Kaserman’s admonition that we cannot prevent
all kidney failure, I am not suggesting that we can. But I am
asking him to consider the following: it would be much less
expensive for society to prevent the renal failure associated
with hypertension, atherosclerosis, obesity, and type II
diabetes than to have an expectation that we will resolve
those medical problems at the corner kidney vendor store.
That recommendation has international support.4 As to the
ethical challenge, this recommendation is made for a patient
population that is mainly uninsured and constitutes a
substantial portion of the list (and a sizeable portion of
those who do not get access to the list).
Which takes me to Dr Kaserman’s third point about the
list, and for me to inquire: does Dr Kaserman know of the
profile of the kidney patients who are dying on the list? Has
Dr Kaserman evaluated the profile of patients who have died
in the immediate post-transplant period with a functioning
transplant? These data must shape the debate as well. The
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Division of Transplantation of HRSA has given a clear
direction to UNOS: increase the total number of expected
life-years gained in the first 5 years after the transplant for all
deceased donor kidney recipients compared to what would be
expected for these patients had they remained on the waiting
list. As a result, UNOS is underway with a reassessment of the
kidney allocation system in this country.
These are realistic times for us to care as best we can for
those who are before us in need. However, we cannot have an
expectation that the young live vendor is the solution for the
enlarging elderly population of candidates on the waiting list,
previously deficient of proper medical care over the course of
their lifetime.
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LifeSharers is already using voluntary reciprocal altruism
to increase organ donation rates in the United States.1
LifeSharers is a non-profit organ donation network.
Members agree to donate their organs when they die. They
also agree to offer their organs first to other members, if
any member is a suitable match, before offering them to
non-members.
By directing their donation in this fashion, LifeSharers
members create an incentive for non-donors to register as
donors and join the network.
Membership in LifeSharers is free and open to all at
www.lifesharers.org or by calling 1-888-ORGAN88. Adults
can enroll their minor children.
LifeSharers currently has over 4000 members, including
members in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
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Our proposal to increase deceased organ donations,
‘Voluntary reciprocal altruism,’1 was designed to encourage
anonymous reciprocity without disturbing the altruism
that undergirds current decisions to agree to organ
donation at death. To accomplish this objective we
included an option for potential donors to indicate a
preference for their organs to be donated to those who also
agree to donate. This decision by a few would reward the
many who choose to donate without restriction and,
through the creation of doubt about organ availability,
would penalize non-donors. The phenomenon in which a
few individuals, at a cost to themselves (in this case, the
psychological burden of agreeing to donate), reward the
benefactors of society (the altruistic donors) and punish
the violators of social norms (the selfish non-donors) is
called strong reciprocity. Strong reciprocity enhances
anonymous altruism and is anticipated to increase total
donors even as only a minority opt for restricted donation.
In contrast, the LifeSharer network is a private club in
which members agree to offer their organs first to other
members, if a member is a suitable match. This sort of
insular arrangement does not lend itself to a full
expression of strong reciprocity and thus is not a true
representation of Voluntary reciprocal altruism.
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Preventive measures may not
reduce the demand for kidney
transplantation. There is reason to
suppose this is not the case
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To the Editor: The recent editorial by Delmonico1 suggests
that a national program of aggressive preventive measures
would result in a reduction in demand for kidney
transplantation. There is reason to suppose this is not the
case.
Most patients with chronic kidney disease die from
cardiovascular complications before reaching end-stage renal
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